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NOTES
GATT: HAS THE IMPLEMENTATION
PROCESS BEEN COMPROMISED?
The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")' was es-
tablished in 1947 to address and to promote the development of
international trade. The original GATT treaty has been modified
in subsequent "rounds" of negotiations.2 The Uruguay Round
Agreements Act ("URAA") is the result of the latest round con-
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Docu-
ments [hereinafter BISD], 4th Supp. 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT 1947].
2 See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect Global Envi-
ronment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2134 n.12 (1995) (discussing different rounds); John Morrison,
Gatt's Seven Rounds of Trade Talks Span More Than Thirty Years, Bus. AM., July 7, 1986,
at 8, 9-11 (discussing seven rounds of negotiations which comprise original GATT treaty of
1947 and modifications reached in subsequent rounds of negotiations). The most recent
Round prior to the Uruguay Round was the Tokyo Round which began in 1975 and
culminated in a formal signing in 1979. Id.; see also Agreement on Implementation of Arti-
cle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 12, 1979,
GATT, BISD, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 26 Supp. 171 (1979) [hereinafter Agreement on Implementa-
tion]; James F. Smith and Marilyn Whitney, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the
NAFTA and Agriculture, 68 N.D. L. REV. 567, 567 n.2 (1992) (stating GATT has hosted
seven rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, resulting in tariff reduction).
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ducted in Uruguay.3 One important issue addressed in this round
was the reduction in trade barriers.4
Traditionally, the United States has sought to protect domestic
industry from unfair foreign competition by methods which would
not discourage free trade with other nations.5 Mainly, the United
States has insulated domestic industries from competition with
foreign corporations which export the same or similar goods to
America at significantly lower prices.6 This practice, known as
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1A, Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1339 (1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round]. The 1994 GATT consists of the GALT
1947, as amended, plus certain understandings included in the Uruguay Round Final Act.
Id.; see H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) ("Uruguay Round Agreements Act" [herein-
after URAAD. This is an Act to approve and implement the trade agreements concluded in
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Id. See generally THE GATT' URu-
GUAY RoUND: NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (examining
negotiations comprising Uruguay Round).
4 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, GATT, BISD, 15th Supp. 24 (1968) (establishing first anti-dumping code during
Kennedy Round). The agreements in Kennedy Round were subsequently modified in Tokyo
Round (1975-79); see also Agreement on Implementation, supra note 2, at 171 (resulting in
first Subsidies Code); Jeffery E. Garden, American Trade Law in A Changing World Econ-
omy, 29 INT'L LAW. 15, 17 (1995) (recognizing reduction of tariffs established during Ken-
nedy and Uruguay Rounds of negotiations); Smith & Whitney, supra note 2, at 567 n.2
(noting Gatt's effect on nontariff barrier agreements); Tycho H.E. Stahl, Liberalizing Inter-
national Trade in Services: The Case for Sidestepping the GATT, 19 YALE J. IN'VL L. 405
(1994) (stating GAT provided a framework to negotiate reductions in trade barriers).
5 See Bomont Indus. v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 958, 962 (Ct. Intl Trade 1989) (stat-
ing antidumping law is remedial); Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653,
656 (Ct. Intl Trade 1985) (finding antidumping law designed to protect domestic industry
from actual or threatened injury from imported merchandise); see also Finance Panel
Passes Proposal Implementing Uruguay Round, Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No.3, at 1196 (Aug.
3, 1994) (discussing various Senate proposals for protection of domestic industries); Chris
Alan Johnson, Protectionism Toward Transplants and Obligations Under GATT, FCN
Treaty and OECD Instruments: Trojan Horse or Engine for Growth?, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONrEMP. PROBs. 279, 293-94 (1994) (recognizing United State's strong belief in "benefits of
free market economies, [and] benefits of predictable and stable international trade prac-
tices"); Michael K Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph
Over Diplomats, 29 Ir'L LAw. 389, 390 (1995) (describing United State's goals); Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement as to How the Uruguay Round Serves the Inter-
ests of United States Commerce, 1994 WL 761806 (Sept. 27, 1994) (G.A.T.T.). See generally
Sarah E. Shackelton, Market Access, U.S. Objectives in the Uruguay Round of the GAT,
Bus. AM., Jan. 1, 1994, at 7-8 (stating principal trade negotiating objectives of United
States regarding trade).
6 See Andrew S. Sharkey, Steel Trade Policy: Down in the Dumps, WALL ST. J., May 1,
1995, at 15 (complaining of unfair practices abroad which can potentially lead to market
price distortions in United States). But see Tim W. Ferguson, Business World: Trade Pol-
icy's "Chokepoint", WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1995, at A21 (stating protectionism as way of life
for certain industries can lead to injurious trade barriers). See also Robert H. Lantz, The
Search for Inconsistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in Transition Under United
States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. POLY 993, 998
(1995) (explaining dumping theory as foreign manufacturers strategy to lower prices below
fair market value). See generally Judith H. Bello & Mary E. Footer, Preface to Symposium,
Uruguay Round-GATT/WTO, 29 INT'L LAw. 335, 336 (1995) (discussing impact of GATT
amendments on foreign competition).
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"dumping,"7 is severely limited in Title 19 of the United States
Code.8 These laws are designed to protect the domestic industry
from actual or threatened economic injury by implementing an off-
setting duty on foreign products to achieve comparable prices with
the domestic industry.9
Following the completion of the URAA, Congress passed an Act
designed to implement the trade agreements reached in the nego-
tiations. 10 This implementation process consists of congressional
interpretation of the international agreement and modification of
current trade statutes to reflect the accord. 1 ' During the URAA
implementation process, however, Congress failed to mirror the
agreement, resulting in legislation which failed to accurately re-
flect the accords. Consequently, while the Uruguay Round of
GATT has been hailed as the most extensive round of the trade
agreements, Congress may have prevented the reduction of trade
barriers.12
7 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GA IT 1994, opened for signature
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2.1, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1326 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Act] (stating that product introduced into another country will be consid-
ered "dumped" if export price is less than price of like product charged to exporting coun-
try's consumers); see also Lantz, supra note 6, at 996 (defining "dumping" as "sale of foreign
merchandise in the United States at less than fair value (LTFV) or below the cost of
production").
8 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1988) (stating criteria for imposing duties after determination of
dumping).
9 19 U.S.C. § 1673; see Davis Walker Co. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C.
1978) (holding that anti-dumping Act was enacted to protect domestic industries from for-
eign products priced unfairly low); see also Jack Q. Lever, Jr., Unfair Methods of Competi-
tion in Import Trade: Actions Before the International Trade Commission, 42 Bus. LAw.
1165, 1165 (1986) (noting that purpose of Title 19 was to prohibit unfair competition in
import trade).
10 See Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108
Stat.) 4809 [hereinafter URAA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 19 of
U.S.C.). The House approved the legislation in November 1994 in a 288-146 vote, the Sen-
ate followed with a 76-24 vote a month later. See generally David E. Sanger, Senate Ap-
proves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs; A Victory For Clinton, N.Y. Tvmss, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
11 See William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 19 FOnM INT'L L. J. 427, 446 (1995) (discussing implementation process
and procedures used to ensure legislation reflects accords); Scott H. Segal & Stephen J.
Orava, A review Of recent Decisions Of The United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal
Circuit:Article: Playing The Zone And Controlling The Board: The Emerging Jurisdictional
Consensus And The Court Of International Trade, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 2393, 2394 (1995)
(displaying final process for implementation of GATT agreements).
12 See Thomas J. Dillon Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade, 6 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 350 (1995) (describing Uruguay Round as "most ex-
tensive and far reaching negotiations in history of international trade relations"). See gen-
erally Office of the United States Trade Representative, Statement As To How The Uruguay
Round Serves The Interest Of United States Commerce, (Sept. 27, 1994) (noting that Uru-
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This Note will examine the substantive provisions of the URAA
implementing legislation which address the issue of tariffs in the
form of duties on foreign goods. Part One will trace the changing
standards for substantiating an injury. A substantive injury oc-
curs when a domestic industry sustains an economic loss resulting
from unfair trade practices. Part Two will focus on the steel in-
dustry as an illustration of the tariff debate. The steel industry
effectively demonstrates the ability of an industry to circumvent a
trade agreement that they determined would be unfavorable.
Part Three will illustrate the apparent disparity between GATT
and our implementing legislation. Finally, Part Four will address
the turmoil to result from this disparity. This Note will conclude
that the failure of Congress to implement the agreements reached
in Uruguay will undermine the primary GATT objective, to facili-
tate free trade through the removal of trade barriers.
I. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION UNDER
COUNTERVEILING DUTY ANALYSIS
A countervailing duty is a tariff levied upon a foreign product
which has received a subsidy or grant from its country of origin in
order to foster their lower selling price.13 The objective of the duty
is to elevate the selling price of a foreign good to within the price
range of comparable domestic products.14 The countervailing duty
was designed to offset an unfair competitive advantage enjoyed by
a foreign exporter.15 The United States imposed this duty follow-
guay Round Agreements will benefit "interests" of United States commerce in virtually
every sector of United States economy).
13 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1)(1988) (providing imposition of countervailing duty). The pur-
pose of a countervailing duty is to offset an unfair competitive advantage obtained by a
foreign exporter through government subsidies. Id.; see also David A. Codevilla, Comment,
Discouraging the Practice of What We Preach: Saarstahl I, Inland Steel and the Implemen-
tation Of The Uruguay Round of GATT 1994, 3 GEO. MASON IND. L. REV. 435, 447 (1995)
(noting that U.S. Trade Courts had assumed that forgiveness of private loans granted to
importer constituted countervailable subsidy).
14 See Codevilla, supra note 13, at 448 (discussing impact of price manipulation on do-
mestic market); John R. McIntyre, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in U.S.-Eu Economic
Relations: The Antidote of Regulatory Cooperation, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1698, 1699
(1995) (discussing industrial policy as being government led and designed to protect spe-
cial domestic interests).
15 Often a foreign exporter is subsidized by their government which enables the company
to charge prices significantly lower then the domestic industry. See Thomas M. Boddez &
Michael J. Trebilock, The Case For Liberalizing North America Trade Remedy Laws, 4
MAlNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE, 1, 17 (1995) (noting subsidies result in comparative advantages to
foreign exporter); Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty law: An Economic Perspective, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 199, 210 (1989) (defining subsidies as manipulations designed to favor ex-
[Vol. 11:523
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ing an allegation that a domestic industry would be injured by the
lower selling price of the foreign product. 16
Previously, section 1303 of Title 19 of the United States Code,
authorized the imposition of a countervailing duty on a foreign
company after a domestic industry alleged an injury.1 7 Title 19 did
not require the determination of an injury prior to the imposition
of a duty.'" Injury was presumed if the evidence demonstrated
that a foreign country had bestowed a bounty or grant on the item
imported into the United States.' 9
A. Domestic Industry Member Requirement
Prior to the Uruguay Round, one representative could act on be-
half of the entire domestic industry in initiating a material injury
complaint.2" Presently, to initiate a claim of injury, there must be
sufficient support by interested parties such as the United States
importers and producers of the same product.2 ' The 1979 Tokyo
Round of the GATT raised the threshold requirement for injury
determination involving members who had a subsidies code.22
This agreement required a determination of material injury to the
port sales); see also Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 516 (1903) (finding export
bounty given to exporters by foreign government as remission of excise tax on products
which were exported). But see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-46
(1978) (holding that remission of tax by Japanese government on products that are ex-
ported is not bounty and did not require application of countervailing duty).
16 Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition Based Approach, 41 STAN. L.
Rv. 1153, 1187 (1989) (discussing how injury could translate into lower sales or reduction
in selling price, either resulting in lower profits).
17 Previously, foreign governmental subsidies created a sufficient basis for imposing a
countervailing duty. See TariffAct of 1930, § 303, as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988),
repealed by Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §261, reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.CA.N. (108 Stat.) 4908.
18 See Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (noting in some circumstances bare allegation of injury was enough to begin process
of imposition of countervailing duty on foreign product).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1988), repealed by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-465, § 261 (a), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4908.
20 See Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, CA. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (determining petition filed by one interested party was sufficient to begin
investigation). No other members of the industry supported the American corporation
Southwires' claim of a threat of material injury as a result of Venezuelan imports. Id.
21 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §212, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4844, 4846; see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(cX4), 1673(a)(cX4) (1988
and Supp. V 1993).
22 The subsidies code provided a list of export subsidies, and attempted to prohibit use of
foreign funds to subsidize exports. This was a separate agreement which applied to coun-
tries who agreed to observe these codes. See Agreement on Interpretation and Application
of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, Apr.
12, 1979, BISD, 26th Supp. 56 (1980), 31 U.S.T. 513.
528 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:523
domestic industry as a result of the price of the imported item.23
Evidence of material injury, however, applied only to foreign coun-
tries who had signed the agreement.24 Consequently, this height-
ened protection was only afforded to countries who had accepted
international constraints on the prices set for goods exported to
the United States.25 If a foreign country exported only duty free
goods, however, the domestic industry was required to show in-
jury regardless of whether the country had signed a trade agree-
ment.26 This requirement led to a division between those "coun-
tries under the Agreement" and those that were not.2 v Thus, the
status of the country determined whether the injury test was to be
applied, while the amount of the countervailing duty was deter-
mined by the subsidy the exporting company received.28
During this period, the American domestic industry only had to
allege an injury to be granted swift regulatory protection. The
protection, a countervailing duty, was imposed upon producers
provided they were not from a "country under the Agreement."29
23 Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 303, 701-09 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §1303 (1988) (re-
pealed 1994)). The Act provided that the presence of a subsidy, bounty or grant given to
the exporter by their home country provided enough evidence to permit the application of a
countervailing duty. See Current Administration of U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S. Mexico Free Trade Talks, 11 J. INTL L. Bus.
177, 180 (1990)(noting that Article VI of GATT provides relief to signatory countries with
material injury).
24 See David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction To International Trade Law
In the United States, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 7, 50 (1995) (noting while subsidies code
provided injury test to parties of agreement, only 24 countries agreed to observe it).
25 See Al J. Daniel, Jr. Agricultural Reform: The European Community, The Uruguay
Round And The International Dispute Resolution, 46 Aim L. REV. 873, 889 (1994) (explain-
ing subsidies code applied only to those countries who agreed to adhere to it).
26 See Hawaiian Independent Refinery v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (1978)
(defining foreign merchandise not entering United States custom territory as duty free);
David M. McPherson, Is The North America Free Trade Agreement Entitled To An Econom-
ically Rational Countervailing Duty Scheme?, 73 B.U. L. REV. 47, 51 (1993) (stating evi-
dence of material injury was required prior to imposing a countervailing duty on duty free
imports).
27 The application of subsidies for countries under the agreement was governed by 19
U.S.C § 1677(5) (1988). Subsidies for a country not under the agreement were subject to 19
U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1988).
28 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1988) (directing countervailing duty to be equal to foreign
competitors net subsidy); see also Ronald A. Cass, Trade Subsidy Law: Can A Foolish In-
consistency Be Good Enough For Government Work?, 21 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 609, 633-
34 (1990) (explaining material injury requirement applicability to GAIT signatories); Ken-
neth S. Komoroski, The Failure Of Government To Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under The
GATT, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189, 191 (1988) (explaining membership distinction in context
of countervailing duties of pollution control); Paula Stem, Relating U.S. Trade and Foreign
Investment, 21 U. ML w INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (discussing purpose of counter-
vailing duty).
29 See Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (discussing role of 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (a)(1) (1988) which provided for imposition of
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In Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States,30 the Depart-
ment of Commerce International Trade Administration imposed a
countervailing duty on an exporter of ceramic tiles3 1 in response
to a complaint by a member of the domestic industry.3 2 The ex-
porter appealed the decision which had been rendered without a
determination of injury because Mexico was not a signatory to any
trade agreement with the United States. 3 This was the last time
a court would be faced with this issue. Subsequently, the Uru-
guay Round rendered this contentious issue moot by implement-
ing the requirement that the industry offer substantial proof of
their material injury before a countervailing duty could be im-
posed.3 4 To overcome this evidentiary requirement, the threat of
material injury must be substantial3 5 when compared to all rele-
vant economic factors.36 A member of the domestic industry which
seeks protection through the imposition of a tariff must demon-
countervailing duties on goods from particular countries); Dong Woo Seo, Material Retar-
dation Standard in the U.S. Antidumping Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 835, 855 (1993)
(discussing presumptions of 1930 Act not requiring proof of injury); see also Cementos Ana-
huac Del Golfo, S.A. v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (1988), affd, 879 F.2d 847
(Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (noting countries without international
obligation to United states could be assessed duty without injury determination); Continen-
tal Steel Corp. v. Amax Chemical, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 548, 550 (1985) (construing 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 and 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) as meaning countries not "under the agreement" do not
require proof of injury where bounty or grant applied), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303(a)(1) was ultimately repealed by the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement Act of 1994.
30 Ceramica Regiomontana, 64 F.3d at 1583 (addressing challenge of imposition of duties
of ceramic tiles from Mexico).
31 Id. at 1582 (noting Ceramica as importer of ceramic tiles under review).
32 Id. at 1582.
33 Id.; see Elizabeth C. Seastrum & Priya Alagir, Recent Developments in Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Cases: November 1992 - October 1994, 20 BROOK J. INT'L L. 503,
527-28 (1994) (discussing basis of Court of International Trade dispute).
34 See Uruguay Round Agreement is Reached, Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2104
(Dec. 15, 1993) (noting new requirement regarding burden of proof of injury); see also supra
note 3 (outlining statutory history of Uruguay Round); Seo, supra note 29, at 855-56 (dis-
cussing impact of different injury standards).
35 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1988) (defining material injury as "harm which is not inconse-
quential, immaterial, or unimportant"); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (1988) (stating
that "... material injury shall be made on the basis of evidence that the threat of material
injury is real and that actual injury is imminent").
3 See 19 U.S.C. § 1167(7)(F)(i) (1988); Erik Coulter Luchs, Maximizing Wealth with
Unilaterally Imposed Environmental Trade Sanctions Under the GATT and The NAFTA,
25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 727, 765-67 (1994) (addressing economic ramifications of subsi-
dies); William E. Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commissions, 3 B.U. IN'L L.J. 345, 405-06 (1985) (enumerating "relevant eco-
nomic factors").
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strate a relationship between the injury or threatened material
injury and the imported product.37
Furthermore, the assertion of an injury must be substantiated
by relevant evidence before an investigation into the injury will be
conducted. 38 The heightened requirement of proving an injury or
threatened injury was originally used to encourage reluctant
countries to adopt a trade agreement. 39
B. Protection Through the Application of a Duty
Throughout the 1980s, several domestic industries exploited the
low threshold requirement by merely alleging a threat or exist-
ence of a material injury to obtain swift protection from foreign
competition.4" In particular, during this period the U.S. steel in-
dustry routinely diminished foreign competition through the im-
position of countervailing duties.4 1 Ultimately, the claims which
had led to the duty were found to be without merit.4 2 While these
tariffs were usually rescinded, the delay insured a significant in-
crease in the short term costs of foreign competitors.43 Unable to
prevent the new agreement from requiring proof of a material in-
37 See Final Act, supra note 7, art. 3.5 [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement] (authoriz-
ing country to impose duty in response to dumping); see also United States Steel Group v.
United States, 873 F. Supp. 673 (Ct. Intl Trade 1994); William D. DeGrandis, Proving
Causation in Antidumping Cases, 20 INT'L LAw. 563, 565 (1986) (same); Luchs, supra note
36, at 766-67 (discussing industry related impact of injury); Perry, supra note 36, at 405
(explaining causation requirement).
38 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(1) (1988) (noting investigation will commence upon meeting
§ 1673 pre-requisites); Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1535, 1537 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (outlining statutory pre-requisites to investigation).
39 See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1979) (offering those who participated
greater protection with requirement of actual material injury).
40 See Ernesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde of
Trade Protection, 15 Nw. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 105, 133 (1994) (considering ramifications of
"low threshold" injury standard); Perry, supra note 36, at 405 (explaining standard applied
in determining 'threat").
41 See Asra Q. Nomani & Dana Milbank, Trade Panel Backs Foreign Steel Concerns,
WALL ST. J., July 28, 1993, at A3 (noting in last twenty years, steel industry had routinely
petitioned and acquired duty protection over imported steel).
42 See Peter Scolieri, TraderArbed's Head Blasts Steel's 'Big Six' For Threats Of Suits,
AM. METAL Micr., June 25, 1992, at 1 (stating most suits brought by steel industry would be
held to be without merit); see also Japanese Perspective on Steel; Excerpt From A Speech
From Nippon Steel's Chairman Hiroshi Saito, AM. METAL MKT., Apr. 21, 1994, at 10 (stat-
ing Japanese steel industry had lost 10 million dollars due to meritless allegations of injury
by United States steel industry); U.S. Producers Hail Steel Import Tariffs, MnuNo J., Jan.
29, 1993, at 73 (following allegation of injury temporary duties imposed on 19 foreign coun-
tries ranged from 13% to 109% on estimated two billion dollars worth of foreign steel).
43 See Virgina Gannon, EC Steel Collusion is Alleged, AM. METAL MKT., Aug. 6, 1992, at
2 (citing European Economic Commission assertion that "all measures directed at stabiliz-
ing European Steel prices, such as production quotas and price floors, have been
eliminated.").
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jury, the steel industry focused on the implementation process.
The industry was able to lobby successfully Congress to create a
lower standard of injury." Hence, the steel industry provides an
excellent example of a domestic industry's attempt to overcome
the new heightened requirements under the Uruguay round.45
C. Captive Production's Role In Volume Determination
To determine injury, the International Trade Commission
("ITC"), a governmental agency created to monitor international
trade, examines the volume of the dumped goods and the subse-
quent effect on the domestic producers.46 In considering volume,
an inquiry must involve absolute terms which are relative to the
production or to the consumption of the importing country."
Often, companies will create a product which will be used both for
sale and internal use. Products produced for internal use are re-
ferred to as captive production.48
44 See 132 CONG. REC. E865-01 (1986) (Congressional Record Extension of Remarks of
Hon. John P. Murtha of Pennsylvania) (stating his belief that had Congress not acted, steel
industry would have been destroyed also noting strong role House Steel Caucus played
with Congress); see also 133 CONG. REc. 1,745-03 (1987) (response of House Steel Caucus
Chairman to U.S. Trade Rep. urging penalties for unfairly priced steel imports); 133 CONG.
REc. 7918-05 (1987) (discussing role and history of House Steel Caucus); Marilyn Werber,
Murtha Supports Steel in Trade Letter to Bush, AM. METAL MKT., June 18, 1990, at 1 (re-
porting that House Steel Caucus Chairman supports additional duties).
45 See Michiyo Nakamoto, American Steel Tariffs: Japanese fear Protectionism may be on
the Rise in Washington. Tokyo may be More Assertive in Future, FiN. TusMS, Jan. 29, 1993,
at 5 (reporting Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Miti) issued statements ex-
pressing regret at rulings and called on U.S. authorities to make important judgments in
reaching final ruling).
46 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1988) (directing International Trade Commission ("ITC")
to consider volume of product and effect on domestic industry); Anti-Dumping Agreement,
supra note 37; see also Final Act, supra note 7, art. 3.1. A determination of an injury will be
found when the volume of the dumped product is so significant in relation to the domesti-
cally produced like product that the effect of the lower prices of the imported goods will
cause a suppression or depression on prices of domestic products. Id. See generally
Degrandis, supra note 37, at 565 (explaining causation requirement).
47 See Final Act, supra note 7, art. 3.2 (requiring absolute terms to determine increase in
dumped products).
48 See Indira Chand, Bohrain Industry 'can fill components market gap", MoNEYcLPs,
Feb. 20, 1994. At times a large percentage of a domestically produced product will be con-
sumed internally by original producers as a component part of final product. Id. Captive
production in steel industry includes hot and cold rolled steel. Id.; see also Paul C. Rosen-
thal & Kathleen W. Cannon, Changes to the Injury Provisions of the U.S. Trade Laws
Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, in Ti GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY
RouND AGREEMENT AcT, at 415 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 722,
1995) (defining and explaining captive production); Lyn M. Schlitt, Uruguay Round Agree-
ment Act Amendments to the Injury Provisions of the Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws, in THE GATT, THE WTO AM THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT AcT, at 403
(PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 722, 1995) (analyzing captive produc-
tion and material injury).
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While the determination of injury requires an assessment of the
relation of the volume of imported products to that of domestic
products,4" the GATT agreement does not appear to distinguish
between domestic items produced for sale and those items pro-
duced for internal consumption. 50 The implementing legislation of
Title 19 has created a new focus in the determination of whether
an injury has been sustained. The major issue now is whether, in
determination of volume, the investigation should consider a prod-
uct which is to be consumed internally as a "like product."
51
The issue of captive production was not directly addressed in
any of the final acts of GATT 1994.52 Furthermore, the agreement
specifically defines the domestic industry to be the producers of
the "like product" with no distinction between marketed or cap-
tively consumed products."
Despite the apparent lack of an express directive by GATT, the
URAA, which was designed solely to implement the GATT agree-
ments in the United States, modified an existing statute to include
the issue of captive production.54 In this modification, Congress
directed the ITC to exclude captively produced items in their de-
termination of an actual or threatened material injury to a domes-
tic industry.55 The congressional modification was a landmark de-
parture from the consistent federal case law, which had
49 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(B) (1988) (directing industry to establish injury by volume or
sales of imported merchandise).
50 See Final Act, supra note 7, art. 3.6 (classifring all domestic production as like prod-
uct); Michael Y. Chung, U.S. Antidumping Laws: A Look at the New Legislation, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. COM. REG. 495, 511 (1995) (distinguishing market and domestic production).
51 See Chung, supra note 50, at 507. The like product is compared with the product
which is to be put forth in the merchant market. Id. Section 222 of the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act modified the treatment of the captive production even though even though
Article 3 (relating to injury) and Article 4 (governing domestic industry) remained un-
changed. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 222, pt. 2, (amending
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C) (inserting captive production clause).
52 See generally Final Act, supra note 7 (lacking any reference to issue of captive
production).
53 See Final Act, supra note 7, art. 4. "[T]hose producers whose collective output of a
domestic like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of the
products..." Id. art. 4.1; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1988) (defining domestic industry
as producers of like product).
54 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (directing ITC to focus primarily on
merchant market when domestic producers use significant amounts of domestic product for
captive production); see also Rosenthal & Cannon, supra note 48, at 433 (instructing Com-
mission on how to treat captive production); Schlitt, supra note 48, at 405 (discussing
change to include captive production).
55 See Paula Stern, Regulating U.S. Trade and Foreign Investment, 21 U. ML&AM INTER-
Am. L. REV. 1, 2, 5 (1989) (noting rule-oriented approach of ITC, an independent agency of
U.S. government, in settling trade disputes).
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repeatedly denied the exclusion of captive production figures for
injury determination.56 It would appear that Congress bowed to
intense lobbying efforts by the United States steel industry, an
economic sector which had been ravaged by an increase in the vol-
ume of lower priced foreign goods.
II. THE STEEL INDUSTRY
A. The Steel Industry's Argument For Captive Production
In the past, the steel industry had attempted to achieve captive
production determination by challenging the decisions by the In-
ternational Trade Association ("ITA").57 The industry consistently
challenged the ITA policy of counting all domestic product regard-
less of its end use. The steel industry unsuccessfully argued that
the ITA's method of volume determination inflated the domestic
product count, thereby minimizing the impact of lower priced sub-
sidized foreign products.58 These numbers when later submitted
to the ITC ultimately led to a determination that the industry had
not suffered an injury.59 The ITA's refusal to modify their method
of calculating volume, however, was ratified by both congressional
mandate and by subsequent case law.6 °
56 See Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. DuPont Co., 826 F. 2d 1235, 1245 (3rd Cir. 1987)
(counting captive production as part of overall market supply); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (including captive production in market share
because defendants had choice of whether to use or sell captive production); In re Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 410-11 (1984) (including captive production). But
see Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1981) (excluding captive produc-
tion due to manufacturers limited capacity).
57 See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS 378 (2d ed.
1991) (noting International Trade Association (ITA) is a division of Department of Com-
merce and is responsible for implementation of antidumping duties); see also United States
Steel Group v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 673, 681-82 (Ct. Intl Trade 1994) (arguing for
classification and exclusion of captively produced items). The classification of a certain
number of products as captive production would lead to the exclusion of them in volume
count. This lower domestic count would magnify the market share of the foreign producers,
thus enabling the industry to successfully assert a claim of injury.
58 United States Steel Group, 873 F. Supp. at 682 (rejecting exclusion of captive
production).
59 See ITA Issues Affirmative Determinations in Cases on Circular Welded Steel Pipe,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2064 (Dec. 13, 1995) (explaining if ITA preliminary deter-
minations reveal a likelihood of dumping, these finding are forwarded to the ITC for final
injury determination); see also Africa/Middle East: Dumping, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
42, at 1786 (Oct. 25, 1995) (noting ITC determination of no injury will result in termination
of matter).
60 See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding production
for captive use was excluded in calculating market share).
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In United States Steel Group v. United States, 61 America's top
five steel producers brought an action against the ITC62 after an
adverse ruling regarding foreign imports.63 The United States
Steel Group ("Steel Group") asserted that foreign steel producers
had sold steel in the United States at prices lower than in their
corresponding home markets. 4 The Steel Group challenged both
the commissions findings and the manner in which the commis-
sion derived its conclusion. 5 After reviewing various factors
which also included inventory, wages, and other economic fac-
tors,6 6 the commission determined the suspect imports did not
have a causal effect on market conditions within the steel
industry.6 7
The Steel Group argued that the Commission's findings were
erroneous since the ITC had not excluded hot-rolled steel as cap-
tive production 8 which was the custom according to agency meth-
odology. 69 The Steel Group asserted that to determine the infiltra-
tion and effect of foreign imports, the agency should have
61 United States Steel Group, 873 F.Supp. at 673.
62 United States Steel Group v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 673, 687 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1994); see also Patrick D. Chisholm, Chalk Up One for Protectionists, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22,
1995, at A10. "The ITC is a six member panel that judges whether U.S. companies in-
volved in antidumping and countervailing duty disputes are being injured from 'unfair'
imports of foreign goods". Id. The Commission is "made up of three democrats and three
republicans. . ." Id.
63 Id. at 679.
64 Id. at 698; see Dana Milbank, Big Steelmakers Agree to Pursue Dumping Claim, WALL
ST. J., May 8, 1992, at B3. "Europeans are selling hot-rolled sheet steel for $342 to $363 in
their home markets but for $300 in the U.S .... [T]he Japanese sell hot-rolled and cold-
rolled sheet steel at home for $518 and $631 respectively, but in the U.S. they sell it for
$405 and $495." Id.
65 United States Steel Group, 873 F. Supp. at 679. "The Commission found by a vote of 5-
1 that imports from Brazil, Germany, France, Korea, and Japan did not cause or threaten
material injury." Id.
66 Id. at 680. The determination of a material injury consists of the International Trade
Commission reviewing the volume of imports, effect on domestic price and production, in-
ventory, employment, wages, and other relevant economic factors. Id.
67 United States Steel Group v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 673, 680 (Ct. Intl Trade
1994).
68 United States Steel Group, 873 F. Supp. at 680 "Petitioners insist that the Commis-
sion should have applied a semi-finished product analysis to the hot-rolled captive produc-
tion, thus treating such hot-rolled product as 'work-in-progress'... ."Id.
69 Id. at 681-82. Petitioners argue that the Commission's approach is contrary to meth-
odology. "[a]pplied in prior determinations for the steel industry, in which captive produc-
tion was excluded. [Hiot-rolled captive production has been counted multiple times across
the steel investigations, in cold-rolled, corrosion resistant and plate production data, in
addition to the hot-rolled industry analysis." Id.
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separated the analysis of the industry figures by cold-rolled steel
and hot-rolled steel.
70
Next, the Steel Group argued the ITC erred by not "cumulat-
ing"71 Korean steel imports with other foreign imports to deter-
mine the penetration of foreign steel competitors. 72 The court de-
termined the Steel Groups' allegations were meritless and the
ITC's determination was sustained.73 The court rejected the Steel
Groups' "late argument" and reasoned that classifying hot-rolled
steel as a captive production would obscure the clear-dividing line
necessary for steel industry analysis.7 4
This case illustrates the difficulty in meeting the proof of injury
requirement from foreign competition without the application of
volume determination. 75 Since volume increases magnify the im-
pact of the lower priced foreign item, volume determination in
conjunction with lower foreign prices may be the best indicator of
potential injury.7 6
The URAA was designed to lower the barriers of trade through
the proof of injury requirement.77 It is submitted that the steel
70 United States Steel Group, 873 F. Supp. at 683-84. The group claimed since hot-rolled
steel would later be integrated into downstream products, counting the hot-rolled steel in
industry figures would result in a double count. Id.
71 For a definition of cumulation see, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7XcXiv)(I) (1988 & Supp 1993)
(stating Commission shall cumulatively assess volume and effect of imports from two or
more countries producing like products subject to investigation if such imports compete
with products of domestic industry).
72 See United States Steel Group v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 673, 685 (Ct. Intl Trade
1994) (agreeing with Commissions decision not to culminate since competition from other
imports was lacking). The majority of Commissioners found the Korean imports service
niche products which were not available from domestic or foreign competitors. Further-
more, the ITC also found the penetration of Korean volume of market share did not ap-
proach a significant level. See id. at 684 (noting volume of competitive imports was so small
that injury could not have resulted solely from them injury).
73 United States Steel Group, 873 F. Supp. at 680 (finding Commission did not err in
determining Dutch and Netherlands import volume was too low to support finding of
threat).
74 Id. at 683 (deciding steel group had sufficient opportunity to argue issue regarding
classification of hot-rolled steel earlier in complaint); id. at 684 (noting there would be no
clear manner to distinguish hot-rolled steel for in-house downstream products); Cambridge
Lee Indus., Inc. v. United States, 13 C.I.T. 1052, 1054, 728 F. Supp. 748, 750 (1989) (hold-
ing that there existed lack of sufficiently clear dividing line to separate domestic product
into different like products).
75 See Gifford-Hill Cement Co. v. United States, 9 C.I.T. 357, 368, 615 F.Supp. 577, 584
(1985) (discussing importance of volume in determination of injury).
76 See United States Steel Group, 873 F. Supp. at 685 (holding that while lost sales on
part of domestic producer due to imports may be hard to confirm, evaluation of volume may
be best evidence to demonstrate injury).
77 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing how agreements attempted to
reduce trade barriers); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (revealing how these
goals were eluded).
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industry circumvented the effect of the higher threshold require-
ment, through the elimination of domestic captive production in
volume calculation.
B. Like Product in Volume Determination
The final texts of the Uruguay Round GATT agreement includes
a definition of "like product.""8 It interprets a like product as
either an identical product or one that "closely resembles" the
product in question.7 9 When a member of a domestic industry as-
serts a dumping charge against a foreign competitor, Title 19
firmly establishes separate and distinct roles for the ITA and the
ITC in determining the injury.8 °
If the ITA determines that the product is the same or similar,
then the ITA must decide if it is being sold by the exporter at less
then fair value ("LTFV").8 1 The ITA must determine that a "class
or kind" of merchandise is being sold in the United States at less
than fair value in order to impose a countervailing duty.8 2
Only after the ITA has made a determination of unfairness in
the marketplace will the ITC inquire as to whether the United
States' domestic industry is being injured.13 The ITC is permitted
78 See Final Act, supra note 7, art. 2.2 (identification of like product was also referred to
in final text as "produit similaire"); see also GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. VI(4), 61 Stat.
24, pt.5 (1948) (defining like product); Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 693 F.
Supp. 1165, 1167 (Ct. Intl Trade 1988) (finding identification of like product necessary to
determine which industry will be examined for injury or threat of injury).
79 See Final Act, supra note 7, art. 2.2 (stating "like product shall be interpreted to mean
a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or
in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects,
has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration."); see also
Exportadores de Flores, 693 F. Supp. at 1168-69 (noting "like product" should not be nar-
rowly construed thereby enabling similar product with minor distinguishing qualities to
evade positive determination nor interpreting overbroadly to achieve particular result).
But see Torrington Co. v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 744, 752-53 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990)(finding that Commission directives regarding similarities between two products not dis-
positive, holding performance of product must be considered).
80 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988) (Interpretive Notes and Decisions) (providing for role of
different governmental agencies in determining injury). See generally Rosenthal & Cannon,
supra note 48, at 430 (discussing separation of ITA and ITC).
81 See Badger-Powhatan Div. of Figgie Lantern v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653, 656
(Ct. Intl Trade 1985) (stating antidumping applicable only if ITA determines that same
class or kind is being sold at less than fair value ("LTFV") and domestic industry is system-
atically injured or threatened).
82 See Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, U.S. Trade Laws and Policy Series #9: The
'Scope of Class or Kind' of Merchandise In Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 20
INT'L LAw. 1015, 1016 (1986) (noting that determination of government subsidy can be re-
flected in practice of pricing product below its fair value).
83 See Holmer & Bello, supra note 82, at 1016 (discussing implication of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673). The determination by the International Trade Commission (ITC) must result in
1996] GATT: COMPROMISED?
to exercise their discretion to decide if the imports of the same
"class or kind" are the ones causing the material injury.84 The
ITC, however, has left the determination of like product to the ITA
and has consistently refused to overrule the ITA's findings.8 5
In Kern-Liebers USA, Inc., v. United States,8 6 Kern-Liebers
challenged the commission's withdrawal of a preliminary determi-
nation 7 that the American steel industry had been materially in-
jured by foreign imports. 8 In a preliminary determination, the
ITA found a material injury to the industry from certain coun-
tries.89 In its final ruling, however, the ITC found that there was
no injury." The Commission based its conclusion upon the deter-
mination that the volume of the lower priced Italian and Belgium
goods was not enough to cause injury.91
The impact of the Commission's negative injury ruling precipi-
tated a dramatic decline in the financial strength of the United
States steel industry.2 The American steel producers alleged that
either the United States domestic industry being injured, threatened with injury, or that
the industry is being materially retarded by reason of imports of that merchandise. Id.
84 See United Engineering & Forging v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 1375, 1391 (Ct. Intl
Trade 1991) (holding ITC has a "wide latitude" in deciding whether products defined by
ITA are actually causing injury).
85 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 978, 984 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989)
(refusing to examine ITA's original determination); Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States,
688 F. Supp. 639, 644 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (accepting ITA's determination of class of mer-
chandise); see also Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 322, 330 (Ct. Intl Trade
1992) (affirming commissions method of classification to determine like product); Iwatsu
Electric Co. v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (Ct. Intl Trade 1991) (upholding
ITC's method of determination).
86 See Kern-Liebers USA, Inc. v. United States, No. 95-9 slip op. at 1 (Ct. Intl Trade Jan.
27, 1995).
87 Id. at 1. The Commission, found reasonable indication that an industry in the United
States was materially injured by reason of allegedly subsidized and/or LTFV imports of
cold-rolled steel products from Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands and Spain. Id.
88 In June 1992, Kern-Liebers, a member of the steel industry, filed a claim of injury
with the ITA concerning the sale of cold-rolled steel imported by U.S. from twenty-one
countries. Id. at 1.
89 See Certain Steel Prods., 57 Fed. Reg. 57,739-85, 57,799-806 (1992) (which found
countervailing duties could be imposed on Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, It-
aly, Korea and Spain); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 37,217-238, 37,374 (1993). The final determina-
tion which reflected the preliminary finding was made on July 1993. Id.
90 Kern-Liebers, No. 95-9, at 1.
91 Kern-Liebers USA, Inc. v. United States, No. 95-9 slip op. at 1, 6 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan.
27, 1995) (noting that low volume and market share of lower priced imports made impact
on domestic industry negligible).
92 See Battered Steel Group Leads Dow Retreat of 2.24 Points, L.A. TAmvs, July 28, 1993,
at D3. "The market seesawed throughout the morning, only embarking downward once
shares of the steel producers headed lower. The Commission would not back charges that
U.S. Steel producers have been injured by dumping from some foreign producers. Bethle-
hem Steel, a Dow component, shed 3 7/8 to 14 7/8." Id.
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the like product analysis was unfair, as the analysis under Title
19 failed to distinguish different grades of steel.93 Both Kern-
Liebers and The United States Steel Group decisions reveal the
complexity and significance of like product determination. The
Commission's final rulings, however, were based upon the ITA's
finding and reflected a traditional reluctance to fragment product
definitions where substantially similar products are available. 94
Consequently, the court rejected Kern-Liebers contention that
cold-rolled steel warranted separate "like product" classification. s5
This ruling followed the Commission's earlier determination in
United States Steel Group96 which categorized hot rolled steel as a
like product regardless of its ultimate use.s 7 In U.S. Steel Group,
the domestic producer argued that the ultimate use of the product
made it unique and, therefore, it should not be counted as "like
product" when determining volume.9 8 This argument was rejected
by the Commission which characterized the hot-rolled steel as a
"like product" regardless of its final nature. 99
The negative injury determinations by the Commission caused
the steel industry to realize that judicial actions would not provide
the necessary protection against foreign imports.100 It is submit-
ted that the steel industry advanced the introduction of captive
93 See Kern-Liebers, No. 95-9, at 3 (arguing that specialized carbon product with distinct
qualities warrants separate like product determination). But see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10)
(1988) (discussing determination of like product).
94 Kern-Liebers, No. 95-9, at 4 (holding characterization of specialized steel products by
distinct metallurgy, end uses, and customer perceptions, would undermine necessary "clear
dividing lines" between potential separate products).
95 See id. at 3 (stating the steel was developed to meet new federal mandated vehicle
specification for seatbelt retractors). The court noted that while the unique end use of a
product may be considered, it is not determinative. Id. For a discussion of unique end use,
see also Drew Winter, It's a material world at this year's SAE show; Society of Automotive
Engineers; Materials & Manufacturing, WARD's AuTo WoRLD, Mar. 1992 (distinguishing
new material by ease of processing, good abrasion, and creep resistance designed to meet
the new federal standards of manufactured cars).
96 873 F. Supp. 673 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
97 Id. at 681 (refusing to recognize distinction based solely on end use).
98 Id. at 682.
99 Id at 694. For a discussion of impact of this determination, see Finance Panel Passes
Proposal Implementing Uruguay Round, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1696 (stating
that under current ITC rules one run of steel can be counted three times as domestic prod-
uct and under Rockefeller Amendment how this inconsistency will be corrected).
1oo See Kern-Liebers U.S.A. v. United States, No. 95-9 slip op. at 1 (Ct. Intl Trade Jan.
27, 1995); Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 633 (Ct. Intl Trade 1988)
(holding that value determinations made in anti-dumping cases must be based upon proof
of actual costs at prices not estimates, approximations and averages); see also United States
Steel Group, 873 F. Supp. at 673 (determining whether material injury has occurred be-
cause of price at less than fair value (LTVF) or subsidized imports under investigation,
requires International Trade Commission (ITC) to consider dollar value of imports, their
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production into the implementing legislation solely as a protective
measure. It would also appear that in acquiescing to the steel in-
dustry, Congress ignored the inevitable challenge by foreign pro-
ducers who perceive this as an unfair trade practice.
III. THE INEVITABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE URAA AND THE
UNITED STATES' IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION
The issue of captive production reflected in the antidumping leg-
islation will prove to be one of the most contentious areas of legis-
lation in the implementation of GATT. The majority of steel pro-
ducers have urged the administration to maintain the anti-
dumping trade laws to protect the United States steel industry.' 0 1
In contrast, healthy domestic industries that engage in global
trade have feared retaliation by the imposition of duties on items
exported to foreign countries from United States industries. 102
Opponents of the antidumping legislation have labeled the statu-
tory language as "protectionism" that is working against the re-
duction of trade barriers between countries. 103
The argument has also been made that the exclusion of cap-
tively produced steel in the determination of total volume could
effect on domestic prices, impact of imports on domestic production of same merchandise,
as well as other economic factors).
101 See Tim W. Ferguson, Business World: Trade Policy's "Chokepoint", WALL ST. J.,
April 11, 1995, at A21 (charging "Old Steel" with attempting to create new barriers to trade
even as GATT was lowering them); see, e.g., Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the
Antidumping Laws, 13 J. INT'L L. Bus. 491, 523 (1993) (noting that U.S. steel producers
have filed 48 antidumping petitions alleging serious and material injury); see also Patrick
D. Chisholm, Chalk Up One for Protectionists, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1995 (noting domestic
steel industry as primary beneficiary of anti-dumping trade laws); Frank Haflich, Support-
ers Fear Hijinks in WTO Reconciliation, AM. METAL MKT., Oct. 2, 1995, at 6A (noting imple-
menting legislation could increase protectionism); Bill Schmitt, Steel Users Take Aim At
GATT Bill, AM. METAL Micr., July 1, 1994, at 1 (noting steel industry's attempts to
"toughen" GATT amendments relating to anti-dumping and countervailing duties); 138
CONG. REC. S12, 357 (1992) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller (Aug. 11, 1992)) (stating some
believe U.S. citizens should reject GATT and current law should remain unchanged).
102 See International Taxation - IRS Administration of Tax - Customs Valuation Rules In
Tax Code Section 1059A GOA Reports March 7, 1994 No. Gao/GGd -94 -61 Feb 4th 1994
(perception of anti-Gatt legislation could be impetus for retaliation by other GAIT mem-
bers); see, e.g., Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:An Anal-
ysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 835-36 (1995) (stating that author-
ity to announce binding trade standards backed by credible threat of economic retaliation
will level "playing field" of international trade).
103 See Barbara Bucholtz, Sawing Off The Third Branch: Precluding Judicial Review of
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Assessments Under Free Trade Agreements, 19 MD.
J. INT'L L. & TRADE 175, 224 n.8 (1995) (describing anti-dumping duties as non-tariff barri-
ers to trade).
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result in an exaggeration when determining the volume ratio. 10 4
While this distortion of volume will facilitate a positive injury de-
termination for the domestic producers, it will unfairly penalize
foreign steel producers.' 05 The most damaging allegation, how-
ever, is that the captive production amendments in the JRAA are
actually in direct conflict with the GATT accords. 10 6
The steel industry saw the Uruguay Round negotiations as an
opportunity to influence the legislature to implement impending
statutory modifications.'0 7 As a result of an amendment intro-
duced by Senator Jay Rockefeller,-0 8 the ITC was required to rec-
ognize captive production in their determination of domestic vol-
ume, and focus primarily on the merchant market in instances
where the captive production is significant. 0 9 This amendment,
adopted in the URAA implementing legislation, has been heralded
by the steel industry as a fair method of volume determination." 0°
It is submitted that Congressional divergence from the original
accords reached in Uruguay will result in maintaining the trade
barriers which foreign producers negotiated to eliminate. It is ex-
pected that foreign producers, injured by what appears to be
United States flagrant disregard of the agreement, will challenge
an injury determination which imposes a countervailing duty.
104 See David Prizinsky, GATT Steel Measures Irk Local Metal Stampers, CRAIN'S CLEVE.
LAND Bus., Nov. 21, 1994, at 17 (stating that foreign importers will be hurt by reduction of
total domestic volume count).
105 Id. at 17 (explaining how captive production amendments to URAA will prevent ITC
from including certain steel products from domestic production calculations); see also Bill
Schmitt, Did U.S. Mill Win or Lose with GATT, IRON AGE NEw STEEL, Jan. 1995, at 33
(asserting that bill will increase likelihood of affirmative injury findings).
106 See Nigel Holloway, Devil's in the Details, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 18, 1994, at 42
(asserting that captive output of domestic production included in URAA legislation is di-
rect contradiction of GATT accord).
107 See Stefanie Lenway & Kathleen Rehbein, Determining an Industry's Political Effec-
tiveness With the U.S. International Trade Commission, Bus. AND Soc., Dec. 1994, at 270
(citing steel industry as example of corporations which encouraged implementation of sanc-
tions, by exerting political pressure designed to influence Congressional decision making
processes).
108 Senator Rockefeller of West Virginia was instrumental in the steel industry's ability
to influence the legislature. See Letter from Jay Rockefeller, United States Senator, Steel-
makers vs. Unfair Trade, WALL ST. J., April 29, 1992, at 19A (stating his support for Amer-
ican steel makers and their progress in world market).
109 See 19 U.S.C. 1677 (7) (c)(iv) (1988) (providing that Commission shall evaluate cap-
tive production and if necessary focus primarily on merchant market to determine volume).
110 See Adam Ritt, A GATT Bill Geared to Limit Imports; GATT Legislation for the Steel
Industry, NEW STEEL, Oct. 1994, at 45 (stating original method of excluding captive produc-
tion to determine volume, would result in double market share); Finance Panel Passes
Proposal Implementing Uruguay Round, Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1196 (Aug. 3,
1994) (noting West Virginian lawmakers support exclusion of captive production as fair
tool for determining accurate volume of imports).
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IV. THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
The inevitable conflict will occur when captive production is
eliminated, resulting in a determination of an injury which other-
wise would not have been found. The challenge will be brought by
the foreign country whose industry has been assessed a duty. The
implementation of GATT 1947 encouraged the resolution of dis-
putes between countries through dispute settlement procedures
proposed by the International Trade Organization ("ITO")."" The
proposal was rendered ineffective, however, when the United
States Senate expressed reluctance to submit to ITO authority.112
Following the elimination of the ITO, the GATT dispute resolution
process was relegated to forum status, where members could at-
tempt an amicable resolution of their differences.'1 3 In the Uru-
guay Round negotiations, the United States placed strong empha-
sis on the development of an efficient governing body to resolve
trade disputes"' and, accordingly, established the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). 115 The Marrakesh Protocol established the
rules necessary for WTO members to implement the provisions
111 For a general overview of International Trade Organization see JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 293-98 (1995). See generally
ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMAcY (1975); JOHN
H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 50-51 (1969).
112 The International Trade Organization was approved in 1948, but U.S. opposition de-
railed the proposal. See Judith Bello & Alan Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No.
24: Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits,
28 INT'L. LAw. 1095, 1096 (1994) (stating in response to U.S. Senate reaction ITO was aban-
doned, leaving GATT as surviving agreement of original).
113 Id. at 1096 (stating belief that both U.S. government and private sector will discern,
dissect, and debate developments in application of new procedures).
114 See Agreement Establishing The Multilateral Trade Organization, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter WTO]. The agreement sought to establish an
effective governing body to facilitate world trade. Id.; see also Helene Cooper, World Trade
Organization Created By GATT Isn't The Lion Of Its Foes Or The Lamb Of Its Backers,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 1994, at All (noting proponents view WTO as effective instrument
giving GATr procedural powers to enforce agreements).
115 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144
(1994); Understanding On Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2 to VITO Agreement, 33
I.L.M. at 1226; see also, Jennifer Schultz, The GATT/WTO Committee On Trade and the
Environment - Toward Environmental Reform, 89 Am. J. Ir'L L. 423, 425 (1995) (stating
formation of WTO was most significant achievement of Uruguay Round).
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reached in GATT. 1 16 The United States has agreed to manage its
trade laws in accordance with GATT and WTO requirements. 117
The United States' agreement to abide by the rules of the WTO
was crucial to the establishment of its authority.,18 While the
United States has agreed to honor the provisions of GATT, United
States courts will apply the laws developed by Congress in inter-
preting the agreement. 1 9 Thus, a United States court presiding
over a trade dispute must follow congressional mandates even if
they appear to be in direct conflict with the GATT accords.120
A trade conflict usually involves a disparity between the inter-
pretation of the provision and its implementing statute.1 21
Although courts will interpret an ambiguous statute in a manner
consistent with GATT, unambiguous statutes will be applied as
constructed. 122 Hence, a United States trade law in direct opposi-
116 See The Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Statement of Administrative Action, for the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement Proposal, reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 655-56 (1994). The Uruguay Round was signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco on Apr. 19, 1994.
117 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Administrative Action Statement, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108
Stat.) 4042 (codified in various sections of Title 19 of U.S.C.). See generally Proclamation of
March 23, 1995, No. 6780, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,845 (1995).
118 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of U.S. partici-
pation); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND Tu LAw OF GATT 50-51 (1969) (noting
GATT 1947 created International Trade Organization (ITO) with similar elements found in
WTO, but lacking United States approval, ITO was relegated to forum where differences
could be discussed).
119 See Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of the Gatt in the Domestic Law of the United
States, in THE EuRoPEAN CoMMuNrry AND GATT 187 (1986) (noting U.S. constitutional
practice requires application of U.S. law even when inconsistent with GATT provided law
was passed after acceptance of GATT); cf. 1 RESTATEMENT (TimRD) OF THE FOREIGN RIELA-
TIONS LAw OF THE UNtrED STATES § 114 (1987) (stating United States statutes must be
construed to avoid conflict with international law or international agreement of United
States); see also John H. Jackson, Status Of Treaties In Domestic Legal Systems: a Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 327 (1992) (questioning whether nation should rely on its
own courts to interpret international treaty for determination of law).
120 H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., § 102(a)(1) (1994) (mandating no provision in Uru-
guay Round shall have effect if inconsistent with any law of the United States).121 See Gloria C. Phares, Retroactive Protectionism of Foreign Copyrights: What Has
Congress Be-GATT, 7 J. PROPRmTARY RIGHTS 2 (1995) (examining impact of retroactive
protection utilized to protect U.S. works abroad); J.H. Reichman, Symposium, Uruguay
Round - GATT/ WTO Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
Under the Trips Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INTL LAW. 345, 381 (1995) (noting
states that tolerate practices not conforming to GATT may find themselves "embroiled in
dispute settlement procedures").
122 See Daewoo Electronics Co., v. International Union of Elect., Technical, Salaried and
Machine-Workers AFL-CIO, 6 F.3d. 1511, 1513 n.1 (Fed.Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2672 (1994) (showing great deference to agency interpretation of statute). "Where goods
identical to the imported goods are sold in the home market of the exporting country, a
margin of dumping is determined by comparing the foreign market value ("FMV") to the
United States price("USP"). The absolute dumping margin for a sale is the amount, if any,
by which the FMV exceeds the USP." Id.
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tion to the trade agreement will foster appeals by foreign import-
ers to the WTO alleging violations of GATT by United States
Courts. 12
3
The first response by the WTO to an alleged violation will be a
recommendation that the countries in disagreement engage in
consultations to resolve their dispute. 124 If unsuccessful, the WTO
will create a panel of three trade lawyers to evaluate the merit of
the claim.125 If the panel determines that a United States trade
law is in conflict with the rules of GATT, the United States will be
subject to severe trade sanctions. 126
Since the WTO has not confronted an imposed duty based upon
the exclusion of captive production, the resolution process in this
area remains untested. Furthermore, whether the United States
will submit to WTO trade sanctions is also uncertain.
CONCLUSION
The Uruguay accord, obtained after seven years of global negoti-
ations, sought to lower trade barriers through the establishment
of a substantive material injury requirement. The United States
steel industry, which perceived the agreement as an economic
threat, successfully lobbied for a congressional modification to the
implementing legislation. While the disparity between GATT and
the United States implementing legislation assuaged the fears of
the steel industries, countries penalized by the discrepancy will
petition for review.
123 See Bill Schmitt, Did U.S. Mills Win or Lose with GATT?, IRON AGE NEW STEEL, Jan.
1995, at 33 (stating "The WTO could give the United States... tough times because (of)
some dumping provisions attached to the GATT bill").
124 See Michael K Young, Symposium, Uruguay Round-Gatt/ WTO Dispute Resolution
In The Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 394 (1995)
(stating parties involved in trade disputes should exhaust possible judicial remedies
through parent country prior to commencing an action before WTO panel and with ability
to form panel as part of dispute resolution process); see also Robert Kuttner, Bringing Bal-
ance to U.S. - Japan Trade, INr'L HERALD Thm., May 13, 1995, at 1 (stating WTO is not
true court since panels cannot impose penalties and are not required to follow rules of due
process).
125 See WTO, supra note 114, at Annex II, art. 8.5 (directing WTO panel to consist of
three individuals); Id. art. 8.4 (assigning Secretariat duty to maintain roster of panelist);
see also Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of how a GATT panel Works and Does Not,
4 IwrkL ARB. 53, 66 (1987) (allowing party to object to panel nominee based on belief of bias).
126 See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect Global
Environment, 83 GEo. L. J. 2131, 2131 (1995) (discussing effectiveness of "sticks" rather
than "carrots" to encourage compliance with GATT agreements). But see Time To Test The
WTO And Free Trade, Cm. TRm., May 9, 1995, at 20 (noting although WTO decision is
binding, sovereign nation could ignore it).
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Before the Uruguay Round, the steel industry routinely sought
the elimination of captive production in volume determination
through the United States courts. Unsuccessful and fearful of the
economic consequences of a heightened injury requirement, the
steel industry sought congressional intervention. In response to
the political pressure, Congress introduced the elimination of cap-
tive production in material injury analysis. The steel industry's
successful interjection of captive production into the URAA legis-
lation has set the international stage for a future conflict.
The ITC received a mandate, in the form of URAA implement-
ing legislation, to exclude captive production in volume count used
to determine injury. Since the ITC must enforce unambiguous im-
plementing legislation, a foreign country challenging the imposi-
tion of a duty will not prevail in a United States court. Ulti-
mately, a complaint will be brought to the WTO by an efficient
foreign producer, alleging the inability to surmount an American
protectionist wall created by the new volume count.
The basis of free trade is premised on the belief that open mar-
kets will only be realized through the reduction of trade barriers.
Multilateral world organizations must ensure that provisions of
GATT, agreed upon after several years of negotiations, are imple-
mented and followed by individual countries. The fair application
of these provisions will lead to the reduction of trade barriers be-
tween countries and permit free trade to be realized.
Mary Fragola & Kevin Lencki
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